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 Command releases JCOA-produced Iraqi perspectives
report
U.S.
Joint Forces Command's Joint Center for Operational Analysis
has completed the unclassified
historical report of military operations conducted in Iraq,
reflecting the Iraqi civilian and military leadership’s
perspective of events.
• Read
the whole report | Read a transcript of the Pentagon
media roundtable
By Jennifer Colaizzi
USJFCOM Public Affairs
(SUFFOLK,
Va., - March 24 , 2006) –- Can history be
wrong? Not exactly, but history can be distorted if data
is provided by only one side’s perspective.
U.S.
Joint Forces Command has released an unclassified historical
report of military operations conducted in Iraq. The twist
is that this historical report reflects the Iraqi civilian
and military leadership’s perspective of events.
“Opinions are not facts; one data point is not a trend,
and a group of data points from a single perspective isn’t
going to convince anyone,” said Army
Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM), Joint
Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) director.
So,
how do you find “ground truth” in battle
analysis? There are multiple options, but only one good answer,
according to Cucolo.
“Ground truth is getting the red side, or enemy’s,
perspective from red,” said Cucolo. “Looking
at the enemy’s actions through American military eyes,” or
even through the eyes of an expert trained in the enemy’s
battle and culture, is valuable, “but it’s still
a friendly’s view of red.”
The
overthrow of Saddam’s regime during Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided an opportunity to study an adversary.
“It’s the first time since World War II, we
had an opportunity to evaluate military events from both
our own perspective and the perspective of the opposing political
and military leadership,” Cucolo said.
“This
means reading their documents, reading their orders, interviewing
their commanders and civilian leaders
and asking what happened.”
This two-year project of delving into the decision-making
processes of the former adversary, started in 2003 and became
known as the Iraqi Perspective Project (IPP).
The Iraqi military leaders wanted to tell their side of
the story.
“Military professionals like to explain their actions,
talk tactics, talk strategy, and give their view of what
happened and why,” the general said. “You get
in a room, roll out a map in front of a former Iraqi general
and say, ‘hey sir, we understood you were here when
this happened, what were your actions?’”
According to Cucolo, in terms of lessons learned, the historical
approach implemented during the IPP provided excellent results.
“If I want to capture the most accurate history I
can, I want to hear what you did and how you made decisions.
I’ll get more through dialogue than if I go about it
and say, ‘Where were you on the night of April 6?’ It
makes interviewees inhibited,” said Cucolo.
The IPP team conducted more than 100 interviews; 23 with
senior members of the former regime.
Interviews
conducted by the IPP team included: Saddam’s
personal secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical
Ali, the secretary of the Republican Guard, both Republican
Guard corps commanders, the commander of the Special Republican
Guard, the director of military intelligence, division commanders
and others.
To augment the interviews conducted in Baghdad, the IPP
team also reviewed thousands of captured documents and the
transcripts of hundreds of hours of secret regime recordings.
They also mined hundreds of existing interrogation transcripts.
The initial classified report has been used in a variety
of Department of Defense training courses, including Capstone,
Pinnacle, and courses at the Joint Forces Staff College.
According to USJFCOM officials, the IPP report provides
useful lessons learned that can be factored into ongoing
and future operational planning against a similar closed
regime.
Noteworthy items mentioned in the unclassified IPP report
include:
• Iraqi
regime belief that Russia and France would act on behalf
of their own economic interests in Iraq to
block any UN Security Council actions to authorize an invasion.
• Fedayeen Saddam planned for attacks in Europe (including
London) and the Middle East
•
Saddam was more concerned about internal revolt than a coalition
invasion; therefore bridges were not blown, oil fields were
not torched, and the south was not flooded – all part
of the inadequate and ineffective military planning done
prior to the invasion.
• Saddam and his inner circle believed their own propaganda
• Chemical Ali was convinced Iraq no longer had WMD, but many
colleagues never stopped believing in them.
• Years of UN sanctions and coalition bombing had reduced the
military effectiveness and usefulness of the Iraqi military
forces.
• Military and ministry leaders lied to Saddam about the true
state of their capabilities.
•
Iraq military capability was also eroded by irrelevant guidance
from the political leadership, creation of “popular” militias,
prominent placement of Saddam relatives and sycophants in
key leadership positions, and an onerous security apparatus.
• The regime ordered the distribution of ammunition around
the country to support a prolonged war with the coalition,
but not to support the insurgency or a guerilla war.
The IPP report is just one example of the work JCOA does
on a daily basis.
“We fill a void. While services do a great job of
tactical and component lessons learned and the Joint Staff
does strategic lessons learned, we do the operational level,” said
Cucolo.
Cucolo stated the IPP is a step in the right direction,
but the directorate is still studying documents to further
expand picture of regime.
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